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Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

Report by Canada

1. At the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, Canada joined consensus on resolution 71/29, in which the Assembly called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Canada abstained on resolution 71/54, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" in which the Assembly, inter alia, called on States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work towards the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. Canada voted against resolution 71/83, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". Canada's concern with that resolution is that it remained unbalanced, unfairly singling out Israel by calling for its accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty while failing to address serious nuclear non-compliance issues by other States in the region. We stress that a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) must be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by States in the region.

2. Canada is committed to advancing the outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference, including a conference on a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Canada expresses its ongoing support for the three convenors to consult broadly with all relevant stakeholders to arrive at modalities for a conference and ensure a successful conference, to be attended by all States in the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. However, it is important to remind ourselves that any WMD-free zone should be negotiated by States in the region for States in the region, with support from other actors as requested.

3. Canada has called for the universal and full adherence and compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty by States in the Middle East. At the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Canada actively supported the adoption of a resolution on the application of safeguards in the Middle East by the IAEA General Conferences in 2005 and 2006. Canada regrets that it was unable to support this annual resolution from 2007 to 2016, given that changes presented by the drafters

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were not the result of a consensus approach and because the resolution during that time period did not address serious breaches in compliance with Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards requirements by some other States in the region, as determined by IAEA and reported by the Agency to the Security Council. Canada has also worked with other States within the context of successive IAEA General Conferences to prevent unhelpful and politically motivated resolutions from having a negative impact on efforts aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

4. Canada notes that, unfortunately, not all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the region have ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. Canada appeals to all States in the region to contribute further to regional stability and security by concluding additional protocols to their respective comprehensive safeguards agreements, which Canada considers the current verification standard pursuant to article III of the Treaty. We urge those States in the region that have signed an Additional Protocol to ratify it without further delay.

5. With regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Canada co-sponsored resolution 71/86 at the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, as well as Security Council resolution 2310 (2016), adopted in September 2016, and continues to encourage all States in the region, particularly those listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, to ratify the Treaty as a confidence- and security-building measure. Canada is also working to construct, test and certify a radionuclide monitoring station as a Contributing National Facility to strengthen the capacity of the Treaty's International Monitoring System to verify compliance with the Treaty.

6. Canada welcomes the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed between the five plus one group (P5+1) and Iran in July 2015, as well as Implementation Day, which took place on 16 January 2016, following the confirmation by IAEA that Iran had implemented the necessary "up-front" commitments. While Canada remains seriously concerned about Iran's long-term nuclear ambitions, given its history of nuclear proliferation and its ongoing ballistic missile programme, we believe that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action can effectively constrain Iran's nuclear programme, so long as the Plan of Action is fully and verifiably implemented. Since 2014, Canada has contributed $10 million to support IAEA verification of Iran's implementation of its commitments under the Join Comprehensive Plan of Action. Iran must fully implement all of the commitments it agreed to under the Plan of Action in order to build the international community's confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful in nature. Canada welcomes Iran's provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement but urges Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol as an additional confidence-building measure.

7. Canada remains deeply concerned about findings that point to possible undeclared nuclear material, facilities and activities in Syria, which suggest nuclear cooperation between Syria and North Korea, in contravention of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Canada fully supported the resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors Resolution (GOV/2011/41), in which the Board requested the IAEA Director-General to report to the United Nations Security Council the assessment that an undeclared nuclear reactor existed at Dair Alzour, in breach of Syria's safeguards obligations. While recognizing the challenges posed by the current security situation in Syria, IAEA continues to report that the Assad regime has failed to provide the cooperation, information and access necessary to address Syria's outstanding compliance issues. We continue to call on Syria to urgently remedy its non-compliance and to meet its own commitment to "fully cooperate with the Agency to resolve related outstanding issues", so that the Agency can provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria's

nuclear programme. Local authorities must provide access to the Agency to all of the sites requested. We also continue to urge Syria to bring into force an Additional Protocol as soon as possible. It is only through full, transparent and proactive cooperation with IAEA that Syria can restore confidence with respect to the scope and nature of its nuclear programme.

8. Canada continues to call on all remaining States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to join as non-nuclear-weapon States. As a confidence-building measure in advance of this ultimate goal, Canada has also called on these same States to separate civilian and military fuel cycles and to place all civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. These statements are in conformity with both the policies and actions of Canada, which include Canada's voting record on the resolutions at the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, which are referenced in paragraph 1 of this report.

9. Canada recognizes the growing interest in nuclear energy among States parties in the Middle East and welcomes the announcements made by a number of such States concerning new initiatives in this field. In welcoming these initiatives, we note that all nuclear power programmes should be accompanied by the strongest commitments to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear security.

Action number	Measures taken
	Australia has also continued its prominent and active role on non-proliferation and disarmament through membership in the 12-nation Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, which Australia and Japan founded in 2010. The key objective of the Initiative is specifically to take forward the 64-point action plan from the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was agreed by consensus and includes most of the steps required to advance the disarmament and non-proliferation objectives encapsulated by the Treaty. Having submitted 17 working papers at the Preparatory Committee sessions for the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and a comprehensive working paper across all three pillars at the Review Conference itself, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative is once again engaging constructively, with a range of working papers for the 2017 May session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference. These include papers on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, a fissile material cut-off treaty and transparency by all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Australia participated in the 2016 Open-ended Working Group taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, where we highlighted the need to pursue the practical, realistic measures necessary to achieve nuclear disarmament. Both at the Working Group and at the Disarmament Commission, Australia drafted, and coordinated support for, papers on the progressive approach to nuclear disarmament. Australia also proposed an East Asia summit statement on non-proliferation (co-sponsored by Myanmar), which was adopted by leaders on 8 September 2016.
2	Australia reaffirms its commitment to applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The support of Australia, inter alia, for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and the negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, nuclear-weapon-free zones and transparency through reporting are consistent with that commitment. Transparency has long been a key focus of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, including during the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle, when we prepared a draft reporting template for nuclear-weapon States. The Initiative also submitted a working paper on non-nuclear-weapon State transparency to the 2015 Review Conference, which included a draft reporting template for non-nuclear-weapon States, and a working paper on transparency by all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty for the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee — with a template that Australia is using for the present report (see response to action 19). Australia participated in several rounds of outreach by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to the P5 in Geneva (2014), New York (2014), London (2015), Washington, D.C. (2016) and Geneva (2017). This afforded further opportunities to underline the importance of transparency. Australia also conducted joint outreach with Japan in Moscow, as part of coordinated outreach by the Initiative to all the P5 capitals to discuss P5 national reports on the Treaty. Australia actively supports and contributes to the work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. For example, Australia has been involved in drafting a number of joint working papers on inspections to verify the dismantlement of a nuclear weapon; and, with Japan, in drafting a joint working paper on transparency to stimulate discussion in Working Group 1 of the Partnership. Australia chairs Working Group 2 of the Partnership. Australia also co-sponsored the

Action number	*Measures taken*
	nuclear disarmament verification resolution led by Norway at the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, and is seeking to join the group of governmental experts established by that resolution.
6	As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Australia supports the establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. Australia has consistently called for the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of a programme of work that would provide for the implementation of this action. Australia continues to support efforts within the Conference to resume substantive work. Australia will participate constructively in the Conference working group on the way ahead in 2017 in an effort to find practical ways to unblock the Conference.
7	As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Australia supports the discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. Australia has consistently called for the adoption by the Conference of a programme of work that would provide for the implementation of this action. Australia continues to support efforts within the Conference to resume substantive work. Australia will participate constructively in the Conference working group on the way ahead in 2017 in an effort to find practical ways to unblock the Conference. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative produced a working paper on nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances for the 2013 session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference. That paper underlined the legitimate interest non-nuclear-weapon States have in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances.
9	Australia is a strong supporter of nuclear-weapon-free-zones freely arrived at by Member States. Australia was an early champion of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which it ratified on 11 December 1986. To give effect to its obligations under the Treaty, Australia enacted the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Act 1986, which, inter alia, prohibits possession of or control over nuclear explosive devices and the stationing of nuclear explosive devices in Australia. Australia advocates for all countries of the region to join the Treaty and continues to encourage the United States of America to ratify the Treaty's protocols without reservation. Australia supports dialogue between members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the nuclear-weapon States on signature by nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone. Australia also welcomed the establishment of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia and the signing by the nuclear-weapon States of the protocols to that Treaty. Australia has continued to co-sponsor the annual General Assembly resolution (most recently, resolution 71/26) on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, since the resolution was made open to non-African States for co-sponsorship at the sixty-fifth session of the Assembly. Australia continues to support the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction, freely arrived at among States of

Action number	*Measures taken*
	the region. Australia encourages all interested parties in the region to engage in a spirit of genuine and constructive cooperation with the aim of finding a resolution to the issue of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. We, as part of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted a working paper on nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances to the 2013 session of the Preparatory Committee, and a working paper on establishing a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East to the 2014 session of the Preparatory Committee. These papers underlined that nuclear-weapon-free zones are an important means for enhancing global and regional peace and security.
11	Australia has enacted national legislation (the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Act 1998 and the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Act 2003) implementing the obligations of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, in preparation for its entry into force. In addition, Australia enacted the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Act 1986, which, inter alia, prohibits the testing of nuclear explosive devices. Through these statutes, a ban on nuclear testing is in force. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative delivered a statement at the session of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization held in 2016, the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty, on strengthening the norm against nuclear testing, which called on all States "to acknowledge and continue the global de facto moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions and refrain from any action that would undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty.
12	The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia outlined the activities of Australia in pursuit of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in the national statement to the 2015 Article XIV Conference held in New York on 29 September 2015.
13	The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Australia and Japan co-chaired a biennial Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty ministerial meeting in New York in 2016 during General Assembly Leaders' Week. The meeting endorsed a joint ministerial statement which demonstrated the resolute opposition of the international community to nuclear testing and called upon all States to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty without delay. With Mexico and New Zealand, Australia is lead sponsor of the annual General Assembly resolution that stresses the fundamental importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and urges its earliest entry into force. Australia underlined the importance of maintaining international momentum towards the entry into force of the Treaty at the 2016 session of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Australia, as a member of the Vienna Group of Ten, submitted a working paper entitled "Vienna issues" to the May 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee, which covered, inter alia, issues relating to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Australia, as a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted a working paper on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty to the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee, which also strongly supported the Treaty's entry into force. The support of Australia for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty also extends to contributing to capacity-building exercises for countries

Action number	*Measures taken*
	considering signature or ratification of the Treaty, especially countries in our own region. For example, in 2015 we worked with Myanmar and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization through a workshop in Myanmar ahead of that country's ratification of the Treaty.
14	Australia hosts the third-largest number of monitoring facilities (21) in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty's International Monitoring System. Australia also actively supports the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization in developing other aspects of its verification regime, including by playing a leading role in developing on-site inspection procedures. Australia works with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, through technical workshops and other outreach measures, to promote development of and cooperation among national data centres. Australia consistently calls on all States to provide strong financial, technical and political support to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization for its work on the Treaty verification regime.
15	Australia is a strong proponent of the commencement of negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, commonly known as the fissile material cut-off treaty. Australia, through its membership in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted a working paper on a fissile material cut-off treaty to the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee. Australia was a member of the Group of Governmental Experts on a fissile material cut-off treaty, which produced a report in 2015. That report is the most thorough intergovernmental analysis to date of the issues surrounding such a treaty. Australia is a member of the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group established by General Assembly resolution 71/259. Australia participated in the consultative meeting convened by that group in March 2017, and will play an active role in the group's future deliberations.
19	Australia and the other 11 members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative presented a number of working papers on transparency during the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle, and also a working paper on transparency by all States parties to the Treaty for the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee. Australia, and the other 11 members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted a working paper on transparency by all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee. This paper highlighted actions 5, 20 and 21 of the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty action plan, encouraged the regular submission of transparency reports by the nuclear-weapon States, and included a new reporting template, which the Initiative encouraged all States parties to use to report on their implementation of Treaty commitments (especially under the 2010 action plan). Australia actively supports and contributes to the work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, including by drafting a joint working paper on transparency with Japan to stimulate discussion in working group 1. Australia also co-sponsored the resolution on nuclear disarmament verification, led by Norway, at the seventy-first session of the General Assembly and is seeking to join the group of governmental experts.

Action number	*Measures taken*
20	The previous report of Australia on implementation of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" is contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/36. This report by Australia on implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference updates our 2012 written report, 2013 verbal update, 2014 written report and 2015 written report on the activities of Australia in support of the 2010 action plan.
22	The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, in September 2011, announced it would actively promote disarmament and non-proliferation education to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. The Initiative produced separate working papers on this issue for the 2012, 2013 and 2017 sessions of the Preparatory Committee. Australia joined Japan, along with 30 other countries, as a co-sponsor for a statement on disarmament and non-proliferation education delivered to the 2013 session of the Preparatory Committee. We again supported the initiative of Japan in 2014. The Government of Australia takes every opportunity to encourage informed community debate on disarmament and non-proliferation issues, for example through speeches delivered by Government ministers and senior officials at numerous forums (including in academia, civil society and think tanks).
Nuclear non-proliferation	
23	In bilateral exchanges and statements in multilateral forums, Australia has consistently called for all States that are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and without preconditions. Australia has also conducted regional outreach activities promoting adherence to and fulfilment of Treaty commitments, including through hosting capacity-building courses and workshops in Australia. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative submitted a working paper on addressing withdrawal from the Treaty to the 2014 session of the Preparatory Committee. Both the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative and Vienna Group of Ten working papers submitted to the 2015 Review Conference also include consideration of article X. The Vienna Group of Ten working paper submitted to the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee included a section on discouraging withdrawal from the Treaty.
24	Australia was the first country to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol (entry into force on 12 December 1997), the first to make it a condition for the supply of uranium exports and the first for which IAEA was able to draw the "broader conclusion" that all nuclear materials and activities of safeguards relevance had been appropriately declared and accounted for. Australia continues to work to promote universalization of and adherence to comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols for all Non-Proliferation Treaty non-nuclear-weapon States. Australia, along with the other members of the Vienna Group of Ten, submitted a working paper to the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee which included the issues of compliance and verification. In this paper and all relevant forums, Australia advocates that the comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol represent the current verification standard pursuant to article III.1 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and for all States parties to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible.

Action number	*Measures taken*
25	Australia encourages all States that have not yet done so to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA, together with an additional protocol. Australia has facilitated discussions, provided expert advice and hosted study tours that assist States to bring into force these agreements. Australia, along with the other members of the Vienna Group of Ten, submitted a working paper to the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee which included the issues of compliance and verification.
26	Australia holds itself to the highest standards of compliance with its non-proliferation commitments and obligations, and cooperates fully with IAEA. Australia consistently and strongly promotes universal compliance by States with their non-proliferation obligations, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and under their agreements with IAEA, including through regular statements at meetings of the IAEA Board of Governors. Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, has presented a working paper covering, inter alia, compliance and verification issues to the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee.
27	Australia holds itself to the highest standards of compliance with its non-proliferation commitments and obligations, and cooperates fully with IAEA. Australia consistently calls on all States to cooperate fully with IAEA and to comply with their international safeguards obligations. Australia provided an extrabudgetary contribution for IAEA to carry out verification activities in support of the P5+1/Islamic Republic of Iran joint plan of action.
28	Australia signed the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997, with entry into force on 12 December 1997. Australia actively encourages all States that have not yet done so to bring into force an additional protocol to their safeguards agreements with IAEA. Australia consistently advocates that a comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with an additional protocol, represents the current verification standard under article III, paragraph 1, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
29	Australia is a founding member of the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network, an informal network of safeguards authorities, ministries and other organizations responsible for implementing safeguards in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. The objective of the Network is to promote best practices with regard to safeguards in the region. The Director-General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office chairs the IAEA Director-General's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. Australia has hosted and assisted in safeguards courses run by IAEA and other partners in the Asia-Pacific region. For instance, in late 2016 Australia hosted a regional training workshop on small quantities protocols. Australia continues to engage with and support South-East Asian and Pacific island States on safeguards issues, particularly those States which have yet to conclude and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, additional protocols and the modified small quantities protocols with IAEA. Australia has offered assistance to some States in the development of their safeguards agreements and arrangements with IAEA.

Action number	*Measures taken*
30	The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative presented a working paper on wider application of safeguards in the nuclear-weapons States to the 2013 session of the Preparatory Committee.
31	Australia has never been eligible for a small quantities protocol. Australia consistently encourages all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty with older small quantities protocols that have not yet amended or rescinded them to do so, as appropriate, as soon as possible. Australia conducts outreach to States, where appropriate, to amend or rescind small quantities protocols.
32	As a member of the Board of Governors, Australia supports the efforts of the Director-General and the Board to continually strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards, including through the use of the State-level concept.
33	Australia always pays its assessed contribution and provides additional extrabudgetary contributions and in-kind support. Australia is a strong proponent of IAEA carrying out its functions with the full cooperation of all States. One of the key elements of support by Australia to IAEA is its active participation on the IAEA Board of Governors and participation in the IAEA member State support programme since 1980. Australia maintains two diagnostic laboratories as part of the IAEA network of analytical laboratories.
34	Australia maintains a strong technology base and technical capabilities, which it makes available to contribute to international safeguards efforts. It also maintains an IAEA member State support programme to support the Agency's technical safeguards capabilities. Australia maintains two diagnostic laboratories as part of the IAEA network of analytical laboratories.
35	Australian uranium is exported for exclusively peaceful purposes and only to countries and parties with which Australia has a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements include treaty-level assurances that Australian nuclear material will be used for peaceful purposes only, and that this material will be subject to IAEA safeguards. These agreements ensure that nuclear exports by Australia remain in exclusively peaceful use and may only be retransferred to a party with a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Australia. Australia currently has 24 such bilateral agreements in force covering 42 countries plus Taiwan Province of China. Australia has ratified the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which is implemented by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 and the Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Act 2007, and is implementing Revision 5 of IAEA INFCIRC/225 (Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities).
36	Australia ensures that nuclear-related exports do not assist in the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Export controls by Australia are based on multilateral best practice. In addition, Australian nuclear agencies cooperate closely with law enforcement and customs agencies to enhance the capability of Australia to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Australia is a member of both the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. The Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations of the Customs Act 1901 state that any item on the control list of Australia (the defence and strategic goods

Action number	*Measures taken*
	list) requires authorization prior to export. The list incorporates the Nuclear Suppliers Group control list (parts I and II), the Zangger Committee trigger list and annexes 1 and 2 of the IAEA Additional Protocol. Australia advocates that States not members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group adhere to the Group's export control guidelines. The Government of Australia has also enacted the Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995. The Act and the associated regulations enable the Government to control the export or transfer of any goods and services that may assist a weapons of mass destruction programme and that are not controlled under other legislation. The Vienna Group of Ten submitted a working paper to the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee which covered, inter alia, export control. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative also submitted a working paper on export controls to the 2013 session of the Preparatory Committee.
37	See response to action 35.
38	Australia has consistently affirmed its support for the development of nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes, within a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security and safety. The Vienna Group of Ten submitted a working paper to the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee which covered, inter alia, cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
39	Australia facilitates the transfer of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties through arrangements such as the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training in Nuclear Science and Technology for the Asia and Pacific Region; the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia; the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme; the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative; other IAEA programmes; and bilateral arrangements.
40	Australia maintains the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, as was recognized by its number 1 ranking for security of its nuclear materials from theft by the Nuclear Threat Initiative Nuclear Security Index in 2012, 2014 and 2016. Australia has been an active participant in the series of nuclear security summits focused on implementing measures to improve global nuclear security regimes, particularly against international terrorism. Australia has contributed over $A2.4 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund since its inception, including support for IAEA activities in the Indo-Pacific region. In November 2013, Australia hosted a mission of the IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service. Australia has also provided experts to a number of other Service missions. Australia expects to host a follow-up Service mission in late 2017. Australia has hosted and supported a number of table-top exercises in support of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Australia also chairs the Initiative's Nuclear Forensics Working Group.

Action number	*Measures taken*
	Both the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative and the Vienna Group of Ten (of which Australia is a member) have submitted working papers which covered nuclear security, including the Vienna Group of Ten working paper on "Vienna issues" submitted to the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee.
41	At The Hague Nuclear Security Summit, Australia committed to realize or exceed the objectives of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 as part of the joint statements on strengthening nuclear security implementation.
42	Australia ratified the amendment on 17 July 2008. As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, we consistently draw attention in our statements to the importance of the 2005 Amendment and call on those which have not yet done so to become party to the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
43	Australia has implemented the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004. Australia has fully implemented the revised supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2011.
44	Australia takes a leading role in actively contributing to the Incident and Trafficking Database, through the detailed analysis, reporting and sharing of lessons learned when dealing with material out of regulatory control. These lessons greatly enhance international awareness and support the enhancement of international frameworks for nuclear safety and security. Australia encourages all States to continue to actively share lessons learned in order to support awareness and the strengthening of nuclear safety and security for material out of regulatory control. The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation has a research programme that seeks to improve capabilities to detect illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, and has engaged in exchanges with regional partners in that regard. Australia enforces effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and works to enhance international cooperation to combat nuclear proliferation, including as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group export control regime.
45	Australia deposited its instrument of ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on 16 March 2012. To implement its obligations under the Convention, Australia enacted the Nuclear Terrorism Legislation Amendment Act 2012. Australia has implemented its requirements under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and plays an active role in the Committee established pursuant to that resolution. Also, Australia has taken every opportunity in its outreach on non-proliferation to inform Asia-Pacific countries of the goals and obligations of the resolution and to offer to work with them to further improve and strengthen their capacity to implement the resolution where possible.
46	Australia, as a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, affirms its support for this recommendation. Australia further broadens its support for IAEA programmes through participation in the Member State Support Programme of IAEA.

Australia, through mechanisms such as support of IAEA technical cooperation projects and the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network, has assisted regional countries in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Australia has requested a mission of the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service in 2018.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

47 Australia respects each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and engages in extensive cooperation with other States parties and international organizations in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses.

48 Australia has shared its experience with neighbouring countries in the safe application of nuclear science and technology through arrangements such as the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training in Nuclear Science and Technology for the Asia and Pacific Region; the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia; the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative; other IAEA programmes; and bilateral cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.

49 As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Australia is involved in deliberations relating to all aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (as noted elsewhere under actions 32, 33, 46 and 58).

The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation participates in the IAEA Standing Advisory Group on Nuclear Applications, providing high-level input on priorities for IAEA research programmes in nuclear technology.

The Organisation participates in the Sahel Project, educating IAEA fellows from the Sahel region in isotopic techniques for groundwater research and management.

The Organisation was designated an IAEA neutron scattering collaborating centre from 2009 to 2012, and as a collaborating centre for multi-analytical techniques for materials research, environmental studies and industrial applications in 2016. These designations provide access for scientists and researchers from the region to facilities and expertise at the Organisation.

Australia joined the Generation IV International Forum in 2016.

50 See response to action 48.

51 See responses to actions 35, 36 and 38.

52 Australia is a longstanding contributor to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund. In 2011, Australia provided $A100,000 in an extrabudgetary Peaceful Uses Initiative contribution to IAEA for a study on the marine impacts of radiation from the Fukushima power plant, and in 2012, contributed $A15,000 to the Peaceful Uses Initiative to study ocean acidification. In 2014, Australia also contributed €20,000 to the IAEA Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy. In 2015, Australia made a $20,000 in-kind contribution to the Sahel Project, hosting two fellows from the Sahel region. In 2015, Australia contributed €600,000 to the Peaceful Uses Initiative.

The policy of Australia has been to pay its annual contribution to the Technical Cooperation Fund in full and on time, and to encourage other States to do the same.

Action number	*Measures taken*
	In addition to the Technical Cooperation Fund, Australia plays a key role in cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the Asia-Pacific region. The nuclear-related agencies of Australia, the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, continue to provide experts to IAEA and to hold a range of meetings with regional counterparts, as part of bilateral cooperation agreements and IAEA projects. Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, presented a working paper on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy to the 2013 session of the Preparatory Committee, and on "Vienna issues" to the 2014 session of the Preparatory Committee, the 2015 Review Conference and the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee, covering, inter alia, cooperation on peaceful uses.
53	See response to action 52.
54	See response to action 52.
55	In 2011, Australia contributed $A100,000 to IAEA for a study on the marine impacts of radiation from the Fukushima power plant. The study is administered by IAEA and conducted under the Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific Region, a treaty-level agreement to which Australia is a party. In 2012, Australia contributed $A15,000 to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative to study Ocean Acidification. In 2014, Australia contributed €20,000 to the IAEA Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy. In 2015, Australia made contributions totalling €600,000 to the Peaceful Uses Initiative.
56	Australia, in cooperation with IAEA, provided training for international participants on a range of topics related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including specialized areas such as radiological crime scene evaluation, nuclear forensics, reactor decommissioning, groundwater management, neutron scattering research, medical physics and the regulation of uranium mining.
57	See responses to actions 38 and 40.
58	Australia recognizes the potential for proposals relating to multilateral fuel assurance mechanisms and multilateralization of the fuel cycle to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. Through its position on the IAEA Board of Governors, Australia has supported multilateral fuel cycle projects and proposals managed by IAEA. Australia supports further discussion of this issue in appropriate international forums.
59	Australia is a party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (and has ratified the amendment to that Convention).

Action number	*Measures taken*
60	Australia took an active part in the 2011 IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which took forward lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident. At the conclusion of that plan, we supported the integration of relevant work into the regular programme. The Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency participates in the development of the IAEA Safety Standards Series, including by senior representation on the Agency's Commission on Safety Standards through the CEO of the Agency. With the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, the Agency has supported the establishment of the IAEA Nuclear Security Series by contributing to the development of the publications and by attending meetings of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee. Australia has nominated Geoff Williams of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency for the position of vice-president of the sixth Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The CEO of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency is a member and former Chair of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. Australia has contributed $A10,000 to the Trust Fund of that Committee to further the work of the Secretariat. On the margins of the IAEA General Conference, Australia hosts a Friends of Responsible Uranium Mining activity with industry involvement that provides a forum to share best practices in uranium mining. The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation played a leading role in the 2016 Nuclear Industry Summit, which brought together leaders of the nuclear industry to strengthen efforts in areas including cybersecurity and reducing the use of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector. Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, presented a working paper on "Vienna issues" to the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee, which covered, inter alia, nuclear safety issues. Australia coordinates the annual IAEA General Conference resolution on measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety. Australia has participated actively in the series of Nuclear Security Summits culminating in 2016 and continues to highlight nuclear security through its membership in the Nuclear Security Contact Group. Through its membership of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and its chairing of the Nuclear Forensics Working Group, Australia hosts and participates in practical discussions and exercises to address potential nuclear security events (see action 40). Australia regularly requests IAEA peer review missions and will host a mission of the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service in 2018.
61	Australia has minimized its possession and use of highly enriched uranium through the exclusive use of low-enriched uranium for its nuclear research reactor fuel and for targets used in the manufacture of medical radioisotopes. Australia expects to increase its supply of the main nuclear medicine isotope, molybdenum-99, this year to approximately 25 per cent of world demand. The success of Australia in this regard has demonstrated that there is no technical reason for the use of highly enriched

Action number	*Measures taken*
	uranium in radioisotope production. Australia has also reduced its remaining stocks of highly enriched uranium. Australia is sharing its experiences in the use of low-enriched uranium in research reactors and radioisotope production, both bilaterally and by participating in IAEA and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency initiatives, including the High-level Group on the Security of Supply of Medical Radioisotopes. In June 2014, Australia signed a ministerial joint declaration to support the OECD initiatives. Australia, through the Vienna Group of Ten, presented a working paper on "Vienna issues" to the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee, which covered, inter alia, the issue of highly enriched uranium minimization under the heading of nuclear security.
62	Australia works to meet the highest standards of safety, security and environmental protection in the transport of radioactive materials through its stringent regulation of nuclear activities, including uranium mining, which takes into consideration all IAEA requirements and recommendations. In 2015, Australia oversaw the safe return from France of intermediate-level waste arising from the reprocessing of spent fuel from our first research reactor, the High Flux Australian Reactor. Australia also participates in the IAEA Shipping and Coastal States Transport Dialogue.
63	Australia supports the principles enshrined in the nuclear liability conventions adopted in 1997 and 2004: the 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage; the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage; and the 2004 Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy. Australia has signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage and is working towards its ratification. At the invitation of the Director-General of IAEA, an Australian expert chairs the IAEA International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability.
64	Australia abides by this decision.

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/13

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
11 May 2017

Original: English

First session
Vienna, 2-12 May 2017

Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear challenge to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Joint statement endorsed by Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

Statement open to all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. We, States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, condemn in the strongest terms the nuclear tests and launches using ballistic missile technology conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in violation of multiple, unanimously agreed Security Council resolutions.

2. The nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which is getting closer to an operational nuclear capability, poses a grave and increasing threat to regional and international peace and security.

3. The pursuit by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of a military nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programme constitutes a grave threat to the international non-proliferation regime, of which the Treaty remains the cornerstone. We urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to the Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards at an early date and abandon its

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nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

4. To this end, we reaffirm that we will faithfully implement the relevant Security Council resolutions and will further strengthen international cooperation.

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/14

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

15 May 2017

Original: English

First session
Vienna, 2-12 May 2017

Towards 2020: reflections of the Chair of the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee

The following points were taken by the Chair from the discussions at the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Chair considers that these reflect basic views on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its review cycle that appear to be shared by its States parties. It is the hope of the Chair that these can serve as a reference point for further discussions in the current review cycle.

1. The Non-Proliferation Treaty remains of central importance to its States parties, which have reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty and the implementation of its provisions.

2. The Treaty contains shared common objectives. Despite disagreements over the pace of its implementation, progress on disarmament, non-proliferation and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are considered to be mutually enabling, reinforcing and balancing elements.

3. The Treaty is the cornerstone of the global regime for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. As such, it is an essential part of the modern collective security system. The current international geopolitical challenges underline the important role of the Treaty and the need to uphold and strengthen it.

4. The Treaty helps us to ease tensions and build confidence between States and, therefore, contributes to a safer, more secure and more peaceful world. As its preamble reflects, the Treaty aims to safeguard its States parties and their peoples from the devastation of nuclear conflict.

5. The Treaty is central to our legal and political efforts on non-proliferation and disarmament. These form a continuing process that is underpinned by the Treaty's review cycle. The Treaty combines a near-universal scope with a legally binding framework.

6. It is important that we maintain an open, inclusive and transparent dialogue at the meetings of the Review Conference and the Preparatory Committee. We must strive to make these meetings as effective and efficient as possible, including by maximizing the continuity between them.

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7. We must, therefore, ensure that the vitality and integrity of the Treaty remain intact, and that we continue to work towards its universalization.

8. With a view to the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty's entry into force in 2020, we should work to identify areas where progress is possible, cooperate in order to move forward and search for compromise where necessary.

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/15

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

22 May 2017

Original: English

First session
Vienna, 2-12 May 2017

Report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session

I. Introduction

1. At its seventieth session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 70/28, took note of the decision of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, following appropriate consultations, to hold the first session of the Preparatory Committee in Vienna from 2 to 12 May 2017.

2. Accordingly, the first session of the Preparatory Committee was opened on 2 May 2017 by Thomas Markram, Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.

3. At the 1st meeting of the Preparatory Committee, on 2 May, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano, delivered a statement.

4. At the 1st meeting of the Preparatory Committee, on 2 May, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Lassina Zerbo, delivered a statement.

5. At the 9th meeting of the Preparatory Committee, on 8 May, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, delivered a statement.

6. The following 114 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons participated in the work of the Preparatory Committee at its first session: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain,

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Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

7. The Preparatory Committee held 16 meetings, of which summary records were provided for the opening meeting (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/SR.1), the general debate (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/SR.1-6) and the closing meeting (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/SR.16), in accordance with a decision taken by the Committee. The summary records are issued separately from the present report (see annex).

8. Ioan Tudor, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Office for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Committee. Cornel Feruta, Chief Coordinator, Director General's Office for Coordination, International Atomic Energy Agency, represented the Agency.

II. Substantive and procedural issues

A. Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee

9. With regard to the chairmanship of the various sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the presidency of the 2020 Review Conference, an understanding had been reached among delegations, according to which a representative of the Western Group should be proposed to chair the first session, a representative of the Group of Eastern European States should be proposed to chair the second session, a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be proposed to chair the third session and a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty should be proposed for the presidency of the 2020 Review Conference. All groups were encouraged to propose the representatives for the chairmanship of the various sessions of the Preparatory Committee and for the presidency of the 2020 Review Conference at their earliest possible convenience.

10. Pursuant to that understanding, Ambassador Henk Cor van der Kwast, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the Conference on Disarmament, the representative of the Western Group, was proposed to chair the first session. At its 1st meeting, on 2 May, the Preparatory Committee elected Mr. van der Kwast by acclamation to serve as Chair of the first session.

11. At its 1st meeting, on 2 May, the Preparatory Committee adopted the following agenda (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/7):

1. Opening of the session.
2. Election of the Chair.
3. Adoption of the agenda.
4. General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee.
5. Statements by non-governmental organizations.
6. Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty

and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East, adopted in 1995; the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference.

7. Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee:

(a) Election of officers;

(b) Dates and venues for further sessions;

(c) Methods of work:

(i) Decision-making;

(ii) Participation;

(iii) Working languages;

(iv) Records and documents.

8. Report on the results of the session to the next session of the Preparatory Committee.

9. Organization of the 2020 Review Conference:

(a) Dates and venue;

(b) Draft rules of procedure;

(c) Election of the President and other officers;

(d) Appointment of the Secretary-General;

(e) Provisional agenda;

(f) Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee;

(g) Background documentation;

(h) Final document(s).

10. Adoption of the final report and recommendations of the Preparatory Committee to the Review Conference.

11. Any other matters.

12. Furthermore, the Preparatory Committee took note of the indicative timetable (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/4) as well as the summarized indicative timetable (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/5).

13. In the course of the discussion on the organization of work of the Preparatory Committee, the following decisions were taken:

(a) Election of officers

Pursuant to the understanding referred to in paragraph 9 above, Ambassador Adam Bugajski, Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations Office and the International Organizations in Vienna, and the representative of the Group of Eastern European States, was proposed to chair the second session. At its 1st meeting, on 2 May, the Committee elected by acclamation Mr. Bugajski to serve as Chair of the second session;

(b) Dates and venues for further sessions

At its 1st meeting, the Committee decided that it would hold its second session from 23 April to 4 May 2018 in Geneva;

(c) Methods of work

(i) Decision-making

At its 1st meeting, the Committee decided to make every effort to adopt its decisions by consensus. In the event that a consensus could not be reached, the Committee could then take decisions in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 2015 Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which would be applied mutatis mutandis;

(ii) Participation

At its 1st meeting, the Committee decided that representatives of States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their countries' nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Committee. No State not party to the Treaty attended the meetings of the Committee as an observer;

Representatives of specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their organizations' nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit, in writing, their views and comments on questions within their competence, which may be circulated as documents of the Committee. Furthermore, the Committee decided, based on the agreement at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference, which would be applied mutatis mutandis, that specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations be invited to make oral presentations to the Committee upon the decision of the Committee, on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, the following specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations were represented as observers at the meetings of the Committee: the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the African Union, the African Commission on Nuclear Energy, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, the European Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Arab States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research;

Representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should be allowed, upon request, to attend the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed, to be seated in the designated area, to receive documents of the Committee and, at their own expense, to make written material available to the participants in the Committee's work. The Committee shall also allocate a meeting to NGOs to address each session of the Committee. Accordingly, representatives of 48 NGOs attended the meetings of the Committee (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/3);

(iii) Working languages

At its 1st meeting, the Committee decided to use Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish as its working languages;

(iv) Records and documents

At its 1st meeting, the Committee decided that summary records would be provided, at each session, for the Committee's opening meetings, the general debate and the closing meetings. There would be records of decisions taken at the other meetings.

14. The Preparatory Committee set aside five meetings for a general debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Committee, in the course of which 82 statements were made. The statements are reflected in the summary records of those meetings (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/SR.1-6). Furthermore, in accordance with the decision adopted at its first meeting, the Committee invited the representatives of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the International Committee of the Red Cross to make statements at the end of the general debate.

15. At its 4th meeting, on 3 May, the Committee heard 18 statements by non-governmental organizations.

16. The Committee held a total of nine meetings for a substantive discussion under agenda item 6.

17. The discussion was structured according to an indicative timetable (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/4), which provided equal time for the consideration of three clusters of issues and three specific blocs of issues.

18. The Committee considered the following three clusters of issues based on the allocation of items to the Main Committees of the 2015 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2015/1, annex V):

(a) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security (articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3; article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12; article VII, with specific reference to the main issues considered in this cluster); security assurances (Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995); effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons);

(b) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones (article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7; articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 in their relationship to articles III and IV; article VII);

(c) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II (articles III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5; article V); other provisions of the Treaty.

19. The Committee considered the following three specific blocs of issues:

(a) Nuclear disarmament and security assurances;

(b) Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East;

(c) Peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other provisions of the Treaty.

The Committee also considered the issue of improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process.

B. Organization of the 2020 Review Conference

20. The Preparatory Committee, in conformity with its task to prepare for the 2020 Review Conference, took the following actions:

(a) Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee

At its 16th meeting, on 12 May 2017, the Committee decided to request the Secretariat to provide for its second session an estimate of the costs of the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including its Preparatory Committee;

(b) Nomination of the provisional Secretary-General of the 2020 Review Conference

At its 16th meeting, on 12 May 2017, the Committee decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 2020 Review Conference, a nomination which would later be confirmed by the Conference itself.

C. Documentation

21. During the session, the Committee had before it the following documents:

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/1	Implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: summary update to the reports submitted by Austria
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/2	Declaration of the member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean on the fiftieth anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco): submission by the secretariat of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/3	Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by Poland
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/4	Establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons: report submitted by Islamic Republic of Iran
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/5	Implementation of article VI: report submitted by Islamic Republic of Iran
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/6	Financial report

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/7	Provisional agenda
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/8	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: national report submitted by New Zealand
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/9	Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report by Japan
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/10	Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by Canada
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/11	Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East: report by Canada
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/12	Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by Australia
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/13	Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear challenge to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: joint statement endorsed by Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America — statement open to all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/14	Towards 2020: reflections of the Chair of the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.1	Procedures in relation to exports of nuclear materials and certain categories of equipment and material under article III (2) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America as the members of the Zangger Committee

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.2	Addressing "Vienna issues": the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; compliance and verification; export controls; cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; nuclear safety; nuclear security; and discouraging withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (the Vienna Group of Ten)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.3	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.4	Security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: working paper submitted by Islamic Republic of Iran
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.5	The inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes: working paper submitted by Islamic Republic of Iran
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.6	Fissile material cut-off treaty: practical steps to implement action 15 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.7	Nuclear non-proliferation: working paper submitted by the European Union
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.8/Rev.1	Peaceful uses of nuclear technology: working paper submitted by the European Union
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.9	Taking forward nuclear disarmament: working paper submitted by Ireland on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa, as members of the New Agenda Coalition
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.10	Informal dialogue between coastal and shipping States: working paper submitted by Australia, Chile, Colombia, France, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as members of the informal dialogue between coastal and shipping States
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.11	Nuclear disarmament: working paper submitted by Islamic Republic of Iran
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.12	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East: working paper submitted by Islamic Republic of Iran

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.13	Strengthening accountability through enhanced transparency and measurability of the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty: working paper submitted by Ireland on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa as members of the New Agenda Coalition
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.14	Non-proliferation in all its aspects: working paper submitted by Islamic Republic of Iran
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.15	Working paper submitted by Syrian Arab Republic
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.16	Disarmament and non-proliferation education and awareness-raising: working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.17	Transparency by all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: joint working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.18	Nuclear testing: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.19	Nuclear-weapon-free zones: working paper submitted by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.20	The inalienable right to develop research, production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.21	Safeguards: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.22	Verification: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.23	Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.24	Nuclear disarmament: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.25	Security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.26	Promotion of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: joint working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.27	Implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by Egypt
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.28	Democratic People's Republic of Korea: working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.29	Suggestions for the 2017 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference from the perspective of the progressive approach: working paper submitted by Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.30	Establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction: joint working paper submitted by Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Sudan, United Arab Emirates and Yemen
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.31	Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction: working paper submitted by Russian Federation
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.32	Security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: working paper submitted by China
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.33	Peaceful uses of nuclear energy: working paper submitted by China
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.34	Nuclear-weapon-free zones and nuclear issues in the Middle East: working paper submitted by China
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.35	Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: working paper submitted by China
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.36	Nuclear disarmament and reducing the danger of nuclear war: working paper submitted by China
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.37	Nuclear disarmament in context: a global governance issue: working paper submitted by Ireland

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.38	Gender, development and nuclear weapons: working paper submitted by Ireland
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.39	Common interests of parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by United States of America
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.40	Chair's factual summary (working paper)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/1/Rev.1	Information for participation by non-governmental organizations
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/2/Rev.1	Information for States parties, observer States and intergovernmental organizations
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/3	List of non-governmental organizations
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/4	Indicative timetable
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/5	Indicative timetable (summarized)
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/6	List of Secretariat officers
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/7	List of participants
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/MISC.1	Provisional list of participants
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/CRP.1	Draft decisions on the organization of work of the Preparatory Committee and the 2020 Review Conference
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/CRP.2	Draft report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/CRP.3	Draft Chair's factual summary

22. A list of the delegations to the Preparatory Committee, including States parties, observer States, specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, is contained in document NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/7.

Annex

Summary records of the first session of the Preparatory Committee

The summary records will be issued individually in documents NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/SR.1-6 and 16.